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TAXATION-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-INCIDENCE OF TAX DETERMINED BY

TESTAMENTARY DIRECTIVE-An inter vivas trust created by testator and
property held jointly with his wife were included in his gross estate
in computing the federal estate tax.1 Testator left his residuary estate to
charity and directed in his will that the estate tax on the above inter vivas
transfers be borne by the property so transferred. The government determined that the estate tax was payable out of the residue and reduced
the charitable deduction2 by the amount of the estate tax attributable to
the inter vivas transfers pursuant to section 812(d) of the 1939 Internal
Revenue Code.3 The district court granted the executor a refund, deciding
that the tax on the inter vivas transfers was payable out of that property
as the testator directed.4 On appeal, held, affirmed. Under Minnesota law
the estate tax falls on the residue unless the testator, as here, indicates
it is to fall on other property. United States v. Goodson, (8th Cir. 1958)
253 F. (2d) 900.
State law, not federal law, determines the incidence of the federal
estate tax; 5 and at common law two rules vie for favor-the residue
rule and the apportionment rule. The residue rule, deemed the majority
view, 6 is that absent a contrary testamentary direction the tax is paid by
testator's residuary estate.7 Bases for the rule are that the testator's silence
indicates his intent to rest the tax on the residue, 8 its function being to
discharge the estate's debts, 9 and that specific legacies indicate testamentary
intent that the legatees get their designated amounts without reduction

1 I.R.C., §§2035-2038 and 2040 include in decedent's gross estate transfers made in
contemplation of death, transfers -with a retained life estate, transfers taking effect at
death, revocable transfers, and property held jointly by decedent with another. The court
did not indicate which of the sections were applicable in the principal case.
2 I.R.C., §2055(a) provides for deduction of bequests to charitable uses.
3 Now I.R.C., §2055(c), which reduces the charitable deduction ,by the amount of
the tax which, by either (1) the terms of the will or (2) the law of the jurisdiction, is
payable out of the charitable bequest.
4 Goodson v. United States, (D.C. Minn. 1957) 151 F. Supp. 416.
5 Riggs v. Del Drego, 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
6 Principal case at 902-903. See also Sutter, "Apportionment of the Federal Estate
Tax in the Absence of Statute or an Expression of Intention," 51 MICH. L. REv. 53 at 53
(1952); Fleming, "Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes," 43 ILL. L. REv. 153 at 159
(1948).
7 Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Dartmouth College, 89 N.H. 471, 200 A. 786 (1938); Young
Men's Christian Association v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47 (1924); Bemis v. Converse, 246 Mass.
131, 140 N.E. 686 (1923); Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265
(1919); Matter of Hamlin, 226 N.Y. 407, 124 N.E. 4 (1919), cert. den. 250 U.S. 672 (1919).
s See Young Men's Christian Association v. Davis, note 7 supra, at 51; Bemis v.
Converse, note 7 supra, at 134.
9 Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Dartmouth College, note 7 supra, at 474; Plunkett v. Old
Colony Trust Co., note 7 supra, at 475-476. See also Hooker v. Drayton, 69 R.I. 290 at
295, 33 A. (2d) 206 (1943).
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for taxes.10 The judicial response of some courts to the residue rule was
the development of the apportionment rule. Under this rule, absent a contrary testamentary direction, the tax is apportioned to the respective properties from which it arises.11 In many states this rule has been established
by apportionment statutes.12 Apportionment saves the residue from obliteration or depletion by the tax,18 thus protecting the residuary legatees,
who are often the testator's dependents.14 Each of the rules supposedly
permits a testator to direct that the tax shall fall as he wishes.15
Testators often direct that certain portions of the testamentary estate
s:hall bear the estate tax burden.16 The principal case is one of the few in
which a testator has attempted in his will to burden non-testamentary
property with a portion of the estate tax and a court, without the aid
of statute, has allowed him to do so.17 That a testator could reach
back in time, and years after a fully completed, unconditional, inter
vivos transfer, command that his transferees pay an estate tax seems a
startling proposition.18 It squarely contradicts the general principle
recognized in this case that " ... once a party has disposed of his property

10 Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Dartmouth College, note 7 supra, at 473-474; In re Cole's
Estate, (Ohio 1952) 111 N.E. (2d) 35.
11 In re Gallagher's Will, 57 N.M. 112 at 125-126, 255 P. (2d) 317 (1953); Industrial
Trust Co. v. Budlong, 77 R.I. 428, 76 A. (2d) 600 (1950).
12 See, e.g., Cal. Probate Code (Deering, 1953) §970; N.J. Stat. Ann. (1953) tit. 3A:25-30
to tit. 3A:25-38; 13 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §124, 1958 Pocket Part 145.
Objections to the apportionment statutes have been that they breed administrative difficulties and interpretative litigation. 30 IND. L. J. 217 at 237-238 (1955); Mitnick, "State
Legislative Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax," 10 Mn. L. REv. 289 (1949). But
most new statutes' meanings become settled after a time. 19 CONN. B. J. 6 at 17 (1945).
Because they tax completed inter vivos transfers, their unconstitutionality has also been
urged, ·but the statutes have usually been -upheld. See, e.g., In re Ryle's Estate, 170 Misc.
450 at 453-454, 10 N.Y.S. (2d) 597 (1939); Matter of Scott, 158 Misc. 481 (1936), affd. In
re Scott's Will, 249 App. Div. 542, 293 N.Y.S. 126 (1937), affd. per curiam Matter of Scott,
274 N.Y. 538, 10 N.E. (2d) 538 (1937).
18 See, e.g., Jeffery's Estate, 32 Pa. D. & C. 5 (1938), affd. Jeffery's Estate, 333 Pa. 15,
3 A. (2d) 393 (1939). There the total tax on the gross estate, including certain inter vivos
trusts, was $4,000 compared with a testamentary estate of $2,000.
14 Sheffield, "Notes on Equitable Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes-A Consideration of Lhe New York Statute," 19 CoNN. B. J. 6 at 15 (1945); 30 IND. L. J. 217 at
228 (1955); 4 INTRA. L. REv. 121 (1949).
'
16 Principal case at 903; Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., note 7 supra, at 475-476;
In re Gallagher's Will, note 11 supra, at 126; and see statutes cited note 12 supra.
16 37 AL.R. (2d) 13 (1954) and cases .there cited; 15 AL,R. (2d) 1216 at 1224 (1951)
and cases there cited.
17 The court's decision was based on its interpretation of applicable Minnesota law.
Recent cases giving effect to such a testamentary direction pursuant to an apportionment
statute are Matter of Slade, 4 Misc. (2d) 616, 158 N.Y.S. (2d) 719 (1956) and Matter of
Ruth, 206 Misc. 423, 132 N.Y.S. (2d) 650 (1954).
18 Other writers have noted the dearth of decisions on such a testamentary directive
but have thought it sustainable. See Fleming, "Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes,"
43 !LL. L. REv. 153 at 167-168 (1948); Karch, "The Apportionment of Death Taxes,'' 54
HARV. L. REv. 10 at 36-45 (1940).
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without reservation he can subsequently exercise no control over such
property." 19 There thus appears to be no basis in property law for the
assertion of the principal case that it is "not unreasonable" to allow
the testator to burden such property with its estate tax.20 Moreover, the
possibility that a subsequent testamentary directive may burden an inter
vivos grantee's property with its estate tax makes uncertain the quantum
of the gift. But counterbalanced against these problems are those arising
from failure to allow the testator to direct the tax burden. An unvarying
application of the apportionment rule would eliminate uncertainty, but
it might also create harmful inflexibility by depleting specific legacies
which the testator may want to pass undiminished.21 The damage from a
uniform application of the residue rule is even greater when the residuary
legatees are the testator's dependents.22 The court could have alleviated
this inflexibility while being consistent with property notions by indicating that a testamentary directive would be permissible if the testator
at the time of the inter vivos transfer had informed his grantee that his
property was subject to the burden of a portion of the estate tax if the
testator later so willed. The testator would then have effectively reserved
some control over the property. But the court did not make any distinction between revocable and irrevocable transfers.23 Instead it chose to
allow unbounded testamentary freedom, with perhaps some justification.
Since the testator has legal control over some types of non-testamentary
property-e.g., revocable trusts-he can as a practical matter always make
such property bear its tax.24 As to non-testamentary property over which
the testator has retained no control-e.g., a gift in contemplation of
death-the very fact that it was included in his taxable estate affords some
basis for the testator's burdening it with a portion of the estate tax. Inter
vivos transfers which are substitutes for testamentary transfers are included and taxed "as if" they were testamentary.25 A testamentary directive, furthermore, does no more damage to traditional property concepts
than does an apportionment rule or statute. The directive in the principal
case operated, like apportionment, to protect the residuary legatees. But
the directive left specific legacies untouched, whereas apportionment would

19 Principal
20 Ibid.
21 Sheffield,

case at 905.

"Notes on Equitable Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes-A Consideration of the New York Statute," 19 CONN. B. J. 6 at 15 (1945).
22 See note 14 supra.
23 The appellate record shows that the trust in the principal case was irrevocable.
But the testator retained considerable control over the corpus, inasmuch as he was both
a trustee and a beneficiary and had the reserved power, together with the other benefi•
ciaries, to distribute the trust property among them.
24 The testator could revoke the trust, bequeath the corpus to the beneficiary, and
make the corpus bear its tax.
25 Ericson v. Childs, 124 Conn. 66, 198 A. 176 (1938).
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have depleted them. Thus the directive is less abusive to willed property
than apportionment, embracing its benefit but not its fault.
The principal case does suggest an unfortunate possibility. It could
arguably be used as authority for a testator to direct that his inter vivos
transferees should bear the entire estate tax. A vindictive testator might
take advantage of such a rule to destroy his inter vivos transfers by taxation. Probably such a decision would go too far. Although there is
nothing in the court's reasoning in the principal case to indicate a valid
basis for so limiting the testator's discretion, perhaps even this court
would not allow a testator to burden the inter vivos property beyond
its proportionate share of the tax.
Robert A. Smith

